Rethinking LeadershipKevin Morrell · companion site

Chapter Six

Ethics

What a leader ‘should’ do, and why virtue ethics answers it better

Marble bust of Aristotle, Roman copy after a Greek original: a weathered portrait head of a bearded man on a plain plinth, turned slightly to one side.
Aristotle. Chapter Six makes the case for virtue ethics as the tradition best suited to the complexities of leadership: agents rather than acts, judged across a whole course rather than a single decision. Marble bust, Louvre. Photo via Wikimedia Commons.

Abstract

From the chapter's own abstract

Ethics has featured in each of the preceding chapters, but it also deserves its own place since leadership is frequently about the exercise of power. This chapter is more theoretical than some of the others since it does not have anchoring cases and it is also shorter, but purposefully so because it makes an argument about what leaders ‘should’ do in a way that makes the proposed framework clearer. The value of doing this is it is focused and in turn something that can be readily applied more thoughtfully. Chapters 1 through 4 suggest there is no neutral representation of events and the previous chapter reinforces this by arguing that the methods we choose also create the world. Since our words and theories make the world this raises a question as to how we think through our ethical responsibilities. Beginning with an outline of the three main normative (i.e. ethical) systems in Western thought: consequentialist ethics, duty ethics, and virtue ethics; it makes a case for why a virtue approach can be comparatively more helpful for thinking through the complexities of leadership. It does so by emphasising three points of departure from these systems: a focus on agents not acts, discussion of the interplay between convention and natural laws, and the role of tradition.

Key questions

  1. Am I judging this decision by its consequences, by a duty it observes, or by what it says about the person making it?
  2. Which of the constraints I am treating as fixed are conventions, and which are genuine natural limits?
  3. What tradition is this organisation reasoning from, and does anyone name it?
  4. If character is assessed over a whole course rather than a single act, what does that change about how this is handled?
  5. Is there redress available here, or is this something that cannot be made good?

Central concepts

  • Fact/value distinction
  • Categorical imperative
  • Universalisability
  • Kingdom of ends
  • Utility
  • Hedonic calculus
  • Doctrine of last resort
  • Virtue ethics
  • Agents rather than acts
  • Nomos and physis
  • Tradition-constituted goods
  • Flourishing
  • Ethics of care

Cases in this chapter

This chapter carries no anchoring case, by design. The argument is made theoretically so that the framework is clear enough to apply elsewhere. Antigone is used briefly to illustrate the tension between convention and natural imperative.

Work with it

Status: abstract quoted directly from the manuscript · questions and concepts are site-written · author review required